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Abstract—Consider a network of k parties, each holding a
long sequence of n entries (a database), with minimum vertex-
cut greater than t. We show that any empirical statistic across
the network of databases can be computed by each party with
perfect privacy, against any set of t < k/2 passively colluding
parties, such that the worst-case distortion and communication
cost (in bits per database entry) both go to zero as n, the number
of entries in the databases, goes to infinity. This is based on
combining a striking dimensionality reduction result for random
sampling with unconditionally secure multi-party computation
protocols.
Index Terms—dimensionality reduction, unconditional privacy,
secure multi-party computation, secure data mining, random
sampling
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a secure multi-party computation problem
involving a connected network of k parties, where the
ith party (i = 1, . . . , k) has a deterministic sequence
xi := xi,1, . . . , xi,n of n entries (e.g., a database), and
wishes to compute a function of the form fi(xk) =
1
n
∑n
l=1 φi(x1,l, . . . , xk,l), where x
k := (x1, . . . ,xk) denotes
the sequences of all the parties. Functions of this form arise in
the context of computing empirical statistics of observations
and are referred to as normalized sum-type functions. The
objective is to construct a (possibly randomized) message-
passing protocol that securely computes these functions with
high accuracy and low communication cost. We assume that
the parties are semi-honest (passive), which means that they
will correctly follow the steps of the protocol, but will at-
tempt to infer the maximum possible information about each
other’s sequences from the data available to them. We require
unconditional privacy against coalitions of size t < k/2. This
means (in a strong statistical sense) that any coalition is unable
to infer any information about the other parties’ sequences
other than what can be inferred from their own sequences and
function estimates.
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In contrast to other secure multi-party computation formula-
tions such as [2], [3], [4], [5], which aim to make the probabil-
ity of error of each function estimate, Pr
[
Fˆi(x
k) 6= fi(xk)
]
,
where Fˆi(xk) is the function estimate of the ith party, equal to
zero or negligible, we consider a novel distortion-theoretic ap-
proach that aims to minimize the maximum expected absolute
error of each function estimate,
max
xk
E
[∣∣Fˆi(xk)− fi(xk)∣∣] , i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
where the expectation is with respect to any randomness
inherent to the protocol in generating the estimate Fˆi(xk).
The distortion is the worst-case expected absolute error across
all deterministic sequences (xk). The communication cost
is given by the number of bits of transmission required by
a protocol divided by n, the length of the sequences, i.e.,
the total number of bits per sample or bitrate. Our main
result is the construction of unconditionally private protocols
that compute any normalized sum-type functions with both
vanishing distortion and vanishing communication cost as
n → ∞, in networks whose minimum vertex-cut1 is greater
than t. While the (perfectly) secure multi-party computation
techniques of [2] can be used to compute any normalized sum-
type function without error (zero distortion), they require O(n)
transmissions (see Section V-A) and hence have non-vanishing
communication cost.
The key to our result is the realization that any normalized
sum-type function can be evaluated accurately even after
drastically reducing the dimensionality of its inputs. Although
there are elegant dimensionality reduction results which show
that distances can be approximately preserved by mapping
high-dimensional signals into a low-dimensional subspace [6],
[7], they are within a centralized computation context and
without privacy constraints. We consider a much more basic
dimensionality reduction that is achieved by a simple random
sampling. It was shown in [8] that an accurate estimate of
the joint type of two sequences can be produced from a
randomized sampling of the sequences. We develop a much
simpler and more general analysis of randomized sampling,
which allows us to analyze the expected distortion, and apply
this result to create accurate estimates of normalized sum-type
functions in a manner that is both secure and communication-
efficient. The randomization in the sampling is crucial for
achieving vanishing distortion with a worst-case distortion
criterion. Sampling by a factor much smaller than n allows us
to use fewer invocations of the secure computation primitives
1The minimum number of vertices (parties) whose removal leaves the
network disconnected.
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2of [2] while securely producing the function estimate with
vanishing communication cost.
It is important to highlight the distinction between a van-
ishing error-probability criterion and a vanishing expected-
distortion criterion. Distributed computation of the joint type
with a vanishing error-probability needs a strictly positive
communication bitrate which does not vanish with increas-
ing blocklength [8], [9], [10], whereas the bitrate vanishes
with blocklength for vanishing expected-distortion [8]. Our
distortion-theoretic approach to secure multi-party computa-
tion thus trades exact computation for arbitrarily high accuracy
in order to gain the advantage of vanishing communication
cost. This makes these results particularly relevant to applica-
tions such as secure statistical analysis of distributed databases,
where data size is overwhelming and only a highly accurate,
but not exact, computation is necessary.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
There are k parties, where each party i ∈ {1, . . . , k} has
private data modeled as a deterministic sequence of n symbols,
xi := (xi,1, . . . , xi,n) ∈ Xni , from some finite alphabet Xi.
Each party i ∈ {1, . . . , k} wishes to compute a function,
fi(x
k), of all of the sequences xk := x1, . . . ,xk. The objec-
tive is to design a multi-party protocol that allows all of the
parties to securely compute their desired functions with high
accuracy and low communication cost. In the remainder of this
section, we describe the class of functions of interest and make
precise the notions of accuracy, security, and communication
cost.
The class of functions that we consider are the rational-
valued, normalized sum-type functions, which means that for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the function fi : Xn1 × . . .×Xnk → Q is
of the form
fi(x
k) =
1
n
n∑
l=1
φi(x1,l, . . . , xk,l), (1)
for some function φi : X1 × . . .×Xk → Q.
A protocol is a sequence of instructions that specifies how
the parties will interact. The execution of a protocol consists
of a sequence of local computations and message transfers
between the parties via bi-directional, error-free channels that
are available between pairs of parties. The messages sent at
any stage of the execution of the protocol may depend on
previously received messages, the sequences that are available
to the parties sending the messages, and any independent local
randomness that is generated. At the end of the protocol, each
party produces a function estimate Fˆi(xk). While the inputs
xk and the functions fi are deterministic, the estimates Fˆi(xk)
may be random due to randomness used by the protocol. We
define the view of a party as the set of all messages sent or
received, and any local randomness generated by that party
during the execution of the protocol. Let the random variables
V1, . . . , Vk denote the views of each of the k parties after the
execution of the protocol.
Accuracy: The distortion criterion to be minimized is the
maximum expected absolute error:
ei(n) := max
xk
E
[∣∣Fˆi(xk)− fi(xk)∣∣] , i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
where the expectation is with respect to the local randomness
that is generated in the execution of the protocol. We em-
phasize that xk are deterministic sequences and the distortion
is the worst-case expected absolute error over all possible
sequences.
Privacy: Since an approximation protocol computes an
estimate instead of the exact function we must require these
two privacy conditions:
1) Protocol Privacy: The protocol should only reveal the
approximate computation.
2) Approximation Privacy: The approximate computation
should not inherently reveal more information than the
exact computation would have.
The first privacy condition is a property of the protocol,
while the second is a property of the approximation that
it produces. In the next two paragraphs we formalize this
first condition, requiring that the protocols securely compute
the randomized function estimate with unconditional protocol
privacy. Later on, in Section VI, we will analyze the privacy
implications inherent to replacing an exact computation with
the approximate estimate that our proposed protocols provide,
and propose an approximation privacy condition that is satis-
fied if the approximation can be made arbitrarily close to the
exact computation with arbitrarily high probability.
We will consider protocols that are unconditionally private
against a colluding coalition of t semi-honest parties T ⊂
{1, . . . , n}, for t < k/2. The semi-honest assumption requires
that each party will correctly follow the protocol, but may
attempt to gather information about other parties’ data from
the view available to it. Unconditional privacy requires that
after the execution of the protocol, the views of any coalition
of size t < k/2 do not reveal any more information, in a
strong statistical sense, about the private inputs and function
estimates of the other parties, than what can be inferred from
the function estimates and inputs of the coalition. We use the
notation VT := {Vi : i ∈ T} and xT := {xi : i ∈ T} to denote
the views and input sequences of the parties in coalition T , and
likewise, xT¯ := {xi : i ∈ T¯} to denote the input sequences
of the parties not in coalition T .
A protocol is unconditionally private if for all coalitions
T ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, with |T | < k/2, the distribution of the
views of the coalition conditioned on the function estimates
of the coalition is only parameterized by input sequences of
the coalition and the views of the coalition are independent of
the function estimates of the non-coalition parties, that is, for
all
(xT ,xT¯ ,x
′
T¯ ) ∈
(∏
i∈T
Xi
)
×
(∏
j∈T¯
Xj
)
×
( ∏
k∈T¯
Xk
)
,
(fˆT , fˆT¯ ) ∈
(∏
i∈T
Fˆi
)
×
(∏
j∈T¯
Fˆj
)
,
such that,
PFˆT ,FˆT¯ (fˆT , fˆT¯ ;xT ,xT¯ ), PFˆT ,FˆT¯ (fˆT , fˆT¯ ;xT ,x
′
T¯ ) > 0,
we have that
PVT |FˆT ,FˆT¯ (vT |fˆT , fˆT¯ ;xT ,xT¯ ) = PVT |FˆT (vT |fˆT ;xT ,x
′
T¯ ).
3This privacy condition is based on a rather strong notion
of statistical indistinguishability. Note that for an uncondi-
tionally private protocol, if the deterministic input sequences
(x1, . . . ,xk) were replaced with sequences of random vari-
ables (X1, . . . ,Xk) drawn from any distribution, then the
views of any coalition T ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, with |T | < k/2, would
satisfy the following Markov chain relationship,
VT − (XT , FˆT )− (XT¯ , FˆT¯ ).
These Markov chain conditions are analogous to the two-party
conditional mutual information conditions of [4], [5] when
appropriately adapted to our problem involving multiple semi-
honest parties.
Communication Cost: For a given protocol, let r denote the
number of bits necessary to send all of the messages required
by the protocol. The communication cost of a protocol is given
by the rate R := (r/n).
We require that the network of parties has a minimum
vertex-cut greater than t which essentially ensures that there
are a sufficient number of non-intersecting paths between any
pair of parties (cf. Figure 1) and, as will become clear in
the sequel, makes unconditional privacy attainable. We will,
however, first develop unconditionally private protocols for
a fully connected network where a bi-directional error-free
channel exists between every pair of parties. We will then
show how these protocols can be re-purposed for partially
connected networks with minimum vertex-cut > t where bi-
directional error-free channels are available only for a subset
of all pairs of parties. The network available can be modeled as
a complete (fully connected network) or incomplete (partially
connected network) graph as illustrated in Figure 1.
(a) Fully connected
(b) Partially connected
Fig. 1. (a) A fully connected network of 5 parties. Each pair of parties may
communicate over a private error-free channel. (b) A partially connected net-
work of 5 parties with a minimum vertex-cut of 2. Parties may communicate
only over a subset of the channels available in the fully connected network.
Every pair of parties has 2 non-intersecting paths connecting them.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Our main result is that as n → ∞, all normalized sum-
type functions can be computed with arbitrarily high accuracy,
vanishing communication cost, and unconditional privacy. The
following theorem asserts that we can construct protocols with
properties that enable this claim for fully-connected networks.
Theorem 1: For all parameters m ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any
normalized sum-type functions f1, . . . , fk, there exist uncon-
ditionally private randomized protocols for fully-connected
networks, with maximum expected absolute errors bounded
by
ei ≤ ‖φi‖2√
m
, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, (2)
where φi is the sample-wise function in the expansion given
by (1), and total communication cost on the order of
R =
O(m log n)
n
. (3)
Proof: This result follows from our analysis of a gen-
eral function approximation method in Section IV and the
protocols constructed in Section V that securely realize this
approximation. See Appendix A for the detailed proof.
An interesting feature of this result is that the error is
independent of the length of the sequences n and is only
controlled by the parameter m. Furthermore, the scaling of
rate as a function of m and n leads to the following corollary
which states that as the sequence length n grows, both
asymptotically vanishing distortions and communication costs
can be achieved by suitably scaling the parameter m.
Corollary 1: For any normalized sum-type functions
f1, . . . , fk, there exist unconditionally private randomized
protocols for fully-connected networks such that as n goes
to infinity, the maximum expected absolute errors ei, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, go to zero and simultaneously the communi-
cation cost R also goes to zero.
Proof: Choose a sequence of parameters mn in Theo-
rem 1 such that as n goes to infinity,
mn →∞, mn log n
n
→ 0.
For example, mn = log(n), or mn = n1−, for  ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, in the context of overwhelmingly large databases, we
can leverage this scaling to achieve low distortion and bit rate.
Our next theorem considers the scenario in which the parties
can only communicate through a partially connected network
that only provides channels for a subset of the pairs of parties.
Theorem 2: Let the k-vertex graph G represent the com-
munication network of the k parties, where there is an edge
between a pair of vertices if there is a channel available
between the corresponding pair of parties. If the graph G has
minimum vertex cut, i.e., the minimum number of vertices
whose removal leaves G disconnected, greater than t, then
the protocols from Section V that satisfy Theorem 1 can be
re-purposed for use in the given network, while remaining
unconditionally private and achieving the same error bound as
in (2) and total communication cost on the same order as in
(3).
4Proof: See Appendix B for the detailed proof.
The implication of this result is that as long as the network
is sufficiently connected, the performance guarantees of Theo-
rem 1 will continue to hold for a partially connected network
while maintaining the same order of magnitude communica-
tion cost.
IV. JOINT TYPE AND FUNCTION ESTIMATION
In this section, we provide key results that enable the con-
struction of protocols that attain the performance guarantees of
Theorem 1. Our protocols, constructed in Section V, produce
a function estimate generated from only a random sampling of
the sequences (x1, . . . ,xk). This technique is a simplified and
generalized version of the striking dimensionality reduction
result that an accurate estimate of the joint type of a pair
of sequences (x1,x2) can be produced from only a random
sampling of the sequences [8], however, our result has been
arrived at by very different means of analysis. We combine this
result with the fact that a normalized sum-type function can
be computed from the joint type in order to form an accurate
function estimate. We will first discuss the dimensionality
reduction result in Section IV-A in order to analyze the
function estimate in Section IV-B.
A. Estimating the Joint Type
Outside the context of secure function computation, we
first discuss a dimensionality reduction result concerning
the estimation of the joint type (empirical distribution)
Px1,...,xk(x1, . . . , xk) from only a random sampling of the
sequences (x1, . . . ,xk). For a given sampling parameter
m ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the random sampling procedure chooses m
locations L1, . . . , Lm ∈ {1, . . . , n} uniformly without replace-
ment. Let (x1, . . . ,xk)L := {(x1,l, . . . , xk,l), l ∈ L} denote
the sequences obtained by sampling (x1, . . . ,xk) according
to the locations in the index set L := {L1, . . . , Lm}.
The full and partial frequency functions (histograms)
N,M : X1 × . . .×Xk → {0, . . . , n} are defined by
N(xk) := nPxk(x
k),
M(xk) :=
∣∣{l ∈ L : (x1,l, . . . , xk,l) = xk}∣∣.
Note that N(xk) is a deterministic quantity based on the
sequences x1, . . . ,xk. However, M(xk) is a hypergeometric
random variable, since m samples are chosen without replace-
ment from a set of size n, where N(xk) of them can contribute
to the value of M(xk).
Let the estimate of the joint type be given by
Pˆxk(x
k) :=
M(xk)
m
. (4)
Lemma 1: For any finite-alphabet sequences
(x1, . . . ,xk) ∈ Xn1 × . . . × Xnk , sampling parameter
m ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and xk ∈ X1 × . . . × Xk, the randomly
sampled type estimate given by (4) has the following
properties:
E
[
Pˆxk(x
k)
]
= Pxk(x
k),
Var
[
Pˆxk(x
k)
]
=
N(xk)(n−N(xk))(n−m)
mn2(n− 1)
≤ N(x
k)
mn
=
Pxk(x
k)
m
,
E
[∥∥Pˆxk − Pxk∥∥2] ≤ 1√m.
Proof: See Appendix C for the detailed proof.
Thus, for any set of sequences (x1, . . . ,xk) of any length n,
the estimate of the joint type of the sequences produced from
only m random samples achieves expected L2-error inversely
proportional to
√
m.
To empirically illustrate the expected L2-error result of
Lemma 1, we conducted simulations that are summarized in
Figure 2. In the simulations, we randomly sampled synthetic
sequences of two different types (uniform and binomial) and
measured the expected L2-error of the sampled type estimate.
By varying the parameters n (length of the sequences) and m
(number of samples), we can see that the expected L2-error of
the estimated type depends only on m and is independent of n.
The black line in each plot represents the (1/
√
m) theoretical
upper bound.
B. Obtaining the Function Estimate from the Joint Type
The random sampling approach can be used to estimate any
normalized sum-type function by expressing it as a function
of the joint type as follows:
fi(x
k) =
1
n
n∑
l=1
φi(x1,l, . . . , xk,l)
=
1
n
∑
xk
φi(x
k)N(xk)
=
∑
xk
φi(x
k)Pxk(x
k).
Let an estimate of fi(xk) based on only the sampled sequences
(xk)I be given by
Fˆi(x
k) :=
1
m
∑
l∈L
φi(x1,l, . . . , xk,l) (5)
=
1
m
∑
xk
φi(x
k)M(xk) (6)
=
∑
xk
φi(x
k)Pˆxk(x
k). (7)
Lemma 2: For any finite-alphabet sequences
(x1, . . . ,xk) ∈ Xn1 × . . . × Xnk , and sampling parameter
m ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the expected absolute error of the randomly
sampled function estimate given by (5) is bounded by
E
[∣∣Fˆi(xk)− fi(xk)∣∣] ≤ ‖φi‖2√
m
,
where ∥∥φi∥∥2 := √∑
xk
|φi(xk)|2.
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(a) Uniform type over values {0, . . . , 9}.
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(b) Binomial type over values {0, . . . , 9} with mean 4.5.
Fig. 2. We conducted the simulation across various choices of the parameters
n (length of the sequences) and m (number of samples), and for both a
uniform type in (a) and a binomial type in (b). Each data point was produced
via an average over 40 independent experiments. The black line in each plot
represents the theoretical upper bound of (1/
√
m).
Proof: See Appendix D for the detailed proof.
Thus, an estimate formed from random samples would sat-
isfy the error claims of Theorem 1. To illustrate the evaluation
of a normalized sum-type function by randomized sampling,
suppose that x ∈ {0, 1}n and y ∈ {0, 1}n are two scalar
sequences and we are interested in estimating their empirical
correlation 1n
∑n
l=1 xlyl. The sequences x and y represent
two separate databases. For example, x may represent the
presence or absence of a specific genetic marker in the DNA
of a large number of tested individuals, and y may represent
the incidence or non-incidence of a certain disease in those
individuals. A researcher may be interested in evaluating
the correlation between x and y. Based on the results of
this section, the researcher can estimate the correlation by
randomly sampling x and y. Figure 3 plots the correlation
estimate as a function of the sampling parameter. The error
bars indicate the accuracy of the estimate, in terms of the
expected absolute error between the true and estimated cor-
relation, where the expectation is taken over 100 independent
experiments each using a different realization of randomized
sampling. As a sanity check, the dashed line plots the true
correlation computed using full versions of the two sequences.
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Fig. 3. Empirical correlation between sequences x and y estimated
by random sampling. The expected absolute error between the true and
estimated correlations is inversely proportional to the square root of the
sampling parameter and independent of the sequence length. Each data point
corresponds to the expected value of the function over 100 realizations of
sampling followed by function evaluation over the samples.
Our next Lemma establishes a large deviation bound for our
function estimate.
Lemma 3: For any finite-alphabet sequences
(x1, . . . ,xk) ∈ Xn1 × . . . × Xnk , and sampling parameter
m ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the probability that the absolute error of the
randomly sampled function estimate given by (5) exceeds δ
is bounded by
Pr
[∣∣Fˆi(xk)− fi(xk)∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ 2 exp(−2δ2m
φrangei
)
,
where
φrangei := (max
xk
φi(x
k))− (min
xk
φi(x
k)).
Proof: See Appendix E for the detailed proof.
An immediate corollary of this result is that the type esti-
mate themselves will satisfy a similar large deviation bound.
Corollary 2: For any finite-alphabet sequences
(x1, . . . ,xk) ∈ Xn1 × . . . × Xnk , sampling parameter
m ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and xk ∈ X1 × . . . × Xk, the probability
that the absolute error of the randomly sampled type estimate
given by (4) exceeds δ is bounded by
Pr
[∣∣Pˆxk(xk)− Pxk(xk)∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ 2 exp(−2δ2m),
Proof: For a given xk ∈ X1 × . . .×Xk, by (7), the type
estimate Pˆxk(xk) can be viewed as a specific function estimate
where φi(yk) is equal to one if yk = xk and zero otherwise.
Thus, we can apply Lemma 3, with φrangei = 1, to yield the
result.
So far we have shown that any normalized sum-type func-
tion of k sequences of length n can be accurately estimated
from randomized sampling with both vanishing distortion and
vanishing communication cost as n → ∞. In the following
6section, we describe how this computation can be performed
in a distributed and unconditionally private manner in a fully
connected network, with distortion and communication cost
still going to zero as n→∞.
V. PROTOCOLS
In this section we provide three protocols that satisfy the
properties claimed in Theorem 1. All of these protocols
make use of unconditionally secure multi-party computation
methods and random sampling to produce function estimates
Fˆi(x
k) as given by (5). In Section IV, we showed that these
function estimates are accurate as claimed in Theorem 1. In
this section, we show that the protocols are unconditionally
private and incur communication cost as claimed in Theo-
rem 1. While these protocols are designed for fully connected
networks, they can repurposed for certain types of partially
connected newtorks as claimed by Theorem 2 and explained
in its proof in Appendix B The first two protocols given in
Section V-A are for the general k-party case (k ≥ 3) and
utilize the secure multi-party computation methods of [2]. In
Section V-B, we give a third protocol that only applies to a
specific three-party scenario, however it is interesting since it
only utilizes simple one-time pad masking techniques.
For all of our protocols, the common first step is for one
of the parties to randomly choose the m sampling locations
L ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, uniformly without replacement, and commu-
nicate them to the rest of the parties with (k − 1)m log n
bits. From here, the specifics of the protocols differ, but
they all require the parties to work with only the sampled
sequences (x1, . . . ,xk)L and result in each party computing∑
l∈L φi(x1,l, . . . , xk,l) = mFˆi(x
k) via finite field arithmetic.
Since the domain X1 × . . . × Xk is finite, the range of each
function fi is a finite subset of Q. Thus, with a sufficiently
large finite field, Fm, to prevent interger-arithmetic overflow,
the computation of
∑
l∈L φi(x1,l, . . . , xk,l) can be performed
with finite field arithmetic in Fm. The computation can be
expressed in a finite field of a size on the order of O(m) since
it is a sum of m rational values from the finite image set of φi.
The finite field representation of
∑
l∈L φi(x1,l, . . . , xk,l) can
then be converted back into a rational number and divided by
m to produce Fˆi(xk). To ease comparison, we have grouped
the presentation of the steps of each protocol (via numbering)
into four distinct phases: 1) sampling the sequences, 2) secret
sharing of the inputs, 3) secure computation on the shares, and
4) revelation of the computed outputs.
All three protocols require O(m log |Fm|) bits in addition
to the m(k−1) log n bits required to transmit L. Since the size
of the finite field need only be on the order of |Fm| = O(m),
the total number of bits needed is actually dominated by the
transmission of L and is on the order of r = O(m log n) as m
and n scale. In the following subsections, we will discuss and
compare the specific communication costs of each protocol.
A. Polynomial Secret-Sharing Based Protocols
We present two protocols that employ the secure multi-party
computation methods of [2], which utilize the homomorphic
properties of polynomial-based secret sharing [11]. These
methods begin with each party generating and distributing
secret shares of its private input to all of the parties. These
shares are unconditionally secure and do not reveal any
information unless collectively recombined. The homomorphic
properties of these shares allow that appropriate additive and
multiplicative operations on the shares produce shares of the
corresponding additive and multiplicative computations of the
underlying inputs. By exploiting this property, shares of the
desired computations can be computed and then collectively
recombined by the appropriate parties in order to perform se-
cure computation. Our two protocols create the same function
estimates, but do so via the different expanded forms given in
(5) and (6).
The first protocol PolyTF (“Type First”) is based on the
function estimate expression given by (6). The parties first
interactively compute homomorphic secret shares of the par-
tial frequency function M . By exploiting the additive form
of function estimates based on M and the homomorphic
properties of the shares, the parties can combine the shares
to compute the desired function estimates. Computation of
M(xk) can be performed using the following expansion
M(x1, . . . , xk) =
∑
l∈L
∏
i∈{1,...,k}
1{xi,l}(xi), (8)
where 1{xi,l}(xi) is the indicator function equal to one if xi =
xi,l and zero otherwise. The PolyTF protocol is outlined by
the following steps:
1) The first party randomly chooses m sampling locations
L ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, uniformly without replacement and
communicates the index set L to the remaining k − 1
parties using m(k − 1) log n bits.
2) For each l ∈ L and i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, party i creates
homomorphic secret shares of the |Xi|-length vector
representing the indicator function 1{xi,l}(·), and sends
a share to each party. This uses a total of m(k−1)(|X1|+
. . .+ |Xk|) log |Fm| bits across all parties.
3a) For each xk ∈ X1 × . . . × Xk and i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
party i produces a share of M(xk) via secure additive
and multiplicative combinations of the shares of the
indicator function vectors according to (8). This step
also requires communication since each multiplication
of shares requires degree reduction and randomization
of shares (see [2] for details). This step uses a total
of m(k − 1)(|X1| · . . . · |Xk|) multiplications and each
multiplication requires a total of k(k−1) log |Fm| bits to
be sent for randomization after degree reduction. Thus,
this step requires a total of mk(k − 1)2(|X1| · . . . ·
|Xk|) log |Fm| bits of communication.
3b) For each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, party i computes a share of
the function estimate Fˆj via
Fˆj [i] =
∑
xk
φj(x
k)Mi(x
k),
exploiting the additive form of the function estimate
given by (6) and the homomorphic properties of the
shares.
4) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the shares Fˆi[1], . . . , Fˆi[k]
are sent to party i, who can recover mFˆi(xk), and
7hence the desired function estimate. This step uses
k(k − 1) log |Fm| bits.
The complexity of this protocol lies mainly in steps 2 and
3a, which create the shares of M(xk). However, note that
the complexity of generating these shares is independent of
the desired function computations, and step 3b consists of
only local computation, requiring no communication. Thus,
the overall communication requirements of this protocol are
independent of the underlying functions to be computed,
f1, . . . , fk. In addition to the m(k − 1) log n bits needed
to distribute the sampling set L, this protocol requires an
additional m(k − 1)((|X1| + . . . + |Xk|) + k(k − 1)(|X1| ·
. . . · |Xk|)
)
log |Fm|+ k(k − 1) log |Fm| bits, which is of the
order of O(m log |Fm|).
The second protocol PolyDS (“Direct Sum”) takes the direct
approach of computing the sum given in (5). The parties first
securely compute shares of φj(x1,l, . . . , xk,l) for each j ∈
{1, . . . , k} and l ∈ L. These shares can then be additively
combined to produce shares of the function estimates. The
PolyDS protocol is outlined by the following steps:
1) The first party randomly chooses m sampling locations
L ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, uniformly without replacement and
communicates the index set L to the remaining k − 1
parties using m(k − 1) log n bits.
2) For each l ∈ L and i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, party i creates
homomorphic secret shares of xi,l, and sends a share
to each party. This uses a total of mk(k − 1) log |Fm|
bits across all parties.
3a) Using the secure computation methods of [2], each
party i ∈ {1, . . . , k} securely obtains a share of
φj(x1,l, . . . , xk,l), for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and l ∈ L,
denoted by φj(x1,l, . . . , xk,l)[i].
3b) For each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, party i additively combines
it shares to produce a share of the function estimate Fˆj
via
Fˆj [i] =
∑
l∈L
φj(x1,l, . . . , xk,l)[i],
exploiting the additive form of the function estimate
given by (5) and the homomorphic properties of the
shares.
4) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the shares Fˆi[1], . . . , Fˆi[k]
are sent to party i, who can recover mFˆi(xk), and
hence the desired function estimate. This step uses
k(k − 1) log |Fm| bits.
The complexity of this protocol mainly lies in the step
3a, consisting of computing the shares of φj(x1,l, . . . , xk,l).
The actual details of this step depend on the structures of
φ1, . . . , φk and how they can be represented by a multi-variate
polynomial over a finite field, which, in principle, is always
feasible by interpolation but could possibly result in a very
high-degree polynomial. Securely computing these functions
thus boils down to securely performing the arithmetic op-
erations of addition and multiplication that make up their
respective polynomial representations. While each addition can
be performed using only localized computation, each multipli-
cation requires additional transmissions amongst the parties to
perform degree reduction and re-randomization on the shares
(see [2] for details). For each multiplication in a particular
function φi, mk(k − 1) log |Fm| bits of communication are
required between all parties and across all samples. Thus,
letting ψi denote the number of multiplications needed to
compute φi, the total number of bits required for step 3b
is mk(k − 1)(ψ1 + . . . + ψk) log |Fm|. In addition to the
m(k−1) log n bits needed to distribute the sampling set L, this
protocol requires an additional (m(ψ1+. . .+ψk+1)+1)k(k−
1) log |Fm| bits, which is of the order of O(m log |Fm|).
B. One-Time Pad Protocol for Three-Parties
In this section, we present a protocol for a specific three-
party scenario, that is a simplified special case of our general
problem setup. Although the previously presented protocols
could be applied to this scenario, the protocol that we discuss
in this section is interesting since it leverages the simple
techniques of one-time pad encryption and additive shares.
For clarity and ease of exposition, we present this three-party
scenario with the parties named as Alice, Bob, and Charlie
and use the following notation. Alice and Bob each have
a sequence of n symbols, denoted respectively by xn :=
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn and yn := (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Yn, where
X and Y are finite alphabets. Charlie wishes to compute a
normalized sum-type function of Alice and Bob’s sequences,
given by
f(xn, yn) =
1
n
n∑
l=1
φ(xl, yl).
This scenario is illustrated in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Alice and Bob have deterministic sequences xn and yn. Charlie
produces an estimate of a function of the sequences, Fˆ (xn, yn).
For this three-party scenario, we propose the OTP protocol,
which leverages a homomorphic property of one-time pad
encryption. Alice and Bob respectively send their sampled
sequences (xl)l∈L and (yl)l∈L, masked (encrypted) with one-
time pads, to Charlie. From these encrypted sequences, Charlie
computes and returns to Alice and Bob encrypted additive
shares of the partial frequency function M . Alice and Bob
decrypt their respective messages from Charlie to obtain the
additive shares of M , from which they derive additive shares
of the function estimate that are returned to be recombined by
Charlie. This technique of first computing additive shares of
M , as an intermediate step, takes advantage of the function
8estimate expansion given by (6). The transmissions required
by and the complexity of implementing this protocol are
independent of the complexity of φ (except indirectly through
the necessary size of Fm).
The steps of the OTP protocol are as follows:
1) Alice randomly chooses m sampling locations L ⊂
{1, . . . , n}, uniformly without replacement. She sends
the set of sampling locations L to Bob using m log n
bits.
2a) Alice also generates two one-time pads (αl)l∈L and
(βl)l∈L, by choosing αl ∼ iid Unif({0, . . . , |X | − 1})
and βl ∼ iid Unif({0, . . . , |Y| − 1}). She sends the two
one-time pads to Bob using m(log |X |+ log |Y|) bits.
2b) Alice applies the pad (αl)l∈L to (xl)l∈L, producing the
encrypted sequence (xl)l∈L, by setting xl = ⊕αl(xl),
where ⊕αl(xl) is a circular shift of the value of xl over
an arbitrary ordering of X by αl positions.
2c) Similarly, Bob applies the pad (βl)l∈L to (yl)l∈L to
produce (yl)l∈L by setting yl = ⊕βl(yl).
2d) Alice and Bob respectively send (xl)l∈L and (yl)l∈L
to Charlie, using a total of m(log |X | + log |Y|) bits.
As Charlie does not know the one-time pads, he cannot
recover Alice’s and Bob’s original samples from the
encryptions (xl)l∈L and (yl)l∈L.
3a) For each l ∈ L, Charlie produces Ql, an |X | × |Y|
matrix indexed by (x, y) ∈ X × Y , where Ql(x, y) =
1{xl,yl}(x, y), which is the indicator function equal to
one if (xl, yl) = (x, y) and zero otherwise.
3b) Charlie splits each Ql into additive shares, by first
independently choosing, across all (l, x, y) ∈ L×X×Y ,
QA,l(x, y) ∼ iid Unif(Fm), then computing QB,l =
Ql −QA,l.
3c) Charlie sends the matrices (QA,l)l∈L to Alice and
(QB,l)l∈L to Bob, using a total of 2m|X ||Y| log |Fm|
bits. This splitting into additive secret shares prevents
Alice and Bob from finding out about each others
sequences.
3d) Alice and Bob separately decrypt (QA,l)l∈L and
(QB,l)l∈L to compute additive shares of M , via
MA(x, y) =
∑
l∈L
QA,l(⊕αl(x),⊕βl(y)),
MB(x, y) =
∑
l∈L
QB,l(⊕αl(x),⊕βl(y)).
3e) Alice and Bob separately compute additive shares of the
function computation, via
FA =
∑
x,y
φ(x, y)MA(x, y),
FB =
∑
x,y
φ(x, y)MB(x, y).
4a) Alice independently generates random salt Z uniformly
over Fm, which she sends to Bob using log |Fm| bits.
The random salt is used to maintain security by statis-
tically decorrelating Alice and Bob’s function estimate
shares from information already held by Charlie.
4b) Alice and Bob send FA + Z and FB − Z to Charlie
using a total of 2 log |Fm| bits. Note that FA + FB =
mFˆ (xn, yn) because of the definition of Ql(x, y). Thus,
Charlie can produce Fˆ (xn, yn).
Thus, in addition to the m log n bits needed to convey the
sampling set L from Alice to Bob, the OTP protocol re-
quires an additional 2m(log |X |+log |Y|+ |X ||Y| log |Fm|)+
3 log |Fm| bits, which is of the order of O(m log |Fm|).
C. Comparison of Protocols
All of our protocols are unconditionally private and pro-
duce the same function estimates Fˆi(xk) while requiring
m(k−1) log n+O(m log |Fm|) bits. Their subtle performance
differences are in the specific constants of the O(m log |Fm|)
term. The relative performance of the protocols varies based on
the specific functions that are required to be computed. Table I
summarizes the comparison of our three protocols, with the
communication costs broken down across the four phases of:
1) sampling the sequences, 2) secret sharing of the inputs,
3) secure computation on the shares, and 4) revelation of the
computed outputs. For each phase, the first row represents the
general costs, while the second row represents the costs when
specialized to the specific three-party setup of Section V-B,
allowing for the comparison of all three protocols in this
particular scenario, since the OTP protocol is only applicable
to the specific three-party scenario described by Section V-B
For functions where the φi functions can be represented as
simple polynomials, the PolyDS protocol is the simplest and
most efficient, possibly using only (m+ 1)k(k − 1) log |Fm|
bits (in addition to the m(k − 1) log n needed to transmit L)
when the computation of the φi functions require no multipli-
cations. However, for functions where φi are more complicated
(e.g., containing absolute values or thresholding), requiring a
high-degree polynomial representation, the complexity and the
bits needed for protocol PolyDS increase. For such functions
it may be better to use the PolyTF protocol, which computes,
as an intermediate step, homomorphic shares of the partial
frequency function M , which is then used to generate shares
of any function estimates at a fixed additional communication
cost. The complexity and bits required by the PolyTF and
OTP protocols are not affected by the complexity of the
φi functions (except indirectly through the necessary size of
Fm), and hence are more efficient than the PolyDS protocol
for very complex φi functions. The OTP protocol is only
applicable to the specific three-party scenario described by
Section V-B, however it is potentially more efficient than
both the PolyTF and PolyDS protocols, and also of interest
since it demonstrates how the simple techniques of one-time
pad encryption and additive shares are sufficient to construct
a secure computation protocol for this specific three-party
scenario.
VI. PRIVACY OF THE APPROXIMATION
The protocols that we propose in Section V compute sam-
pled approximations of the desired functions (according to
the technique presented and analyzed in Section IV) along
with revealing the sampling locations L used to produce
those estimates. Viewing the protocol output as being the
concatenation of the estimate with the sampling locations,
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COMPARISON OF THE COMMUNICATION COSTS OF OUR SECURE COMPUTATION PROTOCOLS
Protocol PolyTF PolyDS OTP
Sampling m(k − 1) log(n) N/A
(3-party) m log(n)
Sharing m(k − 1)(∑i |Xi|) log |Fm| mk(k − 1) log |Fm| N/A
(3-party) 2m(|X |+ |Y|) log |Fm| 4m log |Fm| 2m(log |X |+ log |Y|)
Computation mk(k − 1)2(∏i |Xi|) log |Fm| mk(k − 1)(∑i ψi) log |Fm| N/A
(3-party) 6m(|X ||Y|) log |Fm| 6mψ log |Fm| 2m|X ||Y| log |Fm|
Revelation k(k − 1) log |Fm| N/A
(3-party) 2 log |Fm| 3 log |Fm|
Total O(m logn)
these protocols satisfy the notion of unconditional protocol
privacy as formulated in Section II, which requires that the
protocols do not reveal anything more than these intended
outputs. In this section, we will explore the notion of ap-
proximation privacy, the second condition for privacy that
we mentioned in Section II, which should require that the
approximate computation not reveal any more information
than must be inherently revealed by the exact computation.
The notion of functional privacy introduced by [12, Defini-
tion 5]) is the most stringent form of approximation privacy.
An approximate computation is said to have perfect functional
privacy if it can be simulated (in a statistically indistinguish-
able sense) using only the results of the exact computation
without access to the original inputs. Thus, perfect functional
privacy demands that the distribution of the approximate
computation be only parameterized by the value(s) of the exact
computation, that is,
PFˆ (fˆ ;x
k) = PFˆ (fˆ ; f(x
k)).
If one replaces the deterministic input sequences with random
variables of any distribution, the above condition for perfect
functional privacy would imply the following Markov chain,
Fˆ (Xk)− f(Xk)−Xk.
Functional privacy, while providing a very strong notion of
approximation privacy, can be rather restrictive for practical
applications. In particular, requiring functional privacy would
rule out any random sampling-based approximations for gen-
eral sum-type functions when φ(·) takes more than two values,
even if the sampling locations are concealed. A sampling-
based approximation for a normalized sum-type functions
when the sample-wise function φ(·) is binary-valued (e.g.,
joint/marginal types or normalized Hamming weight/distance)
would be functionally private (provided that the sampling
locations are not revealed). This is because since φ(·) is
binary-valued, the exact computation f(xk) would reveal the
number of locations l ∈ {1, . . . , n} where φ(x1,l, . . . , xk,l)
equals one of the binary values as opposed to the other, and
hence a randomly sampled approximation could be simulated
from knowledge of f(xk) alone. However, the sampling-
based approximation is not functionally private for general
normalized sum-type functions when φ(·) may take more than
two values. To illustrate with a concrete example, consider a
ternary-valued φ(·) with range {0, 1, 2}, and potential input
sequences xk and yk for which
(φ(x[1]), . . . , φ(x[n])) = (1, 1, . . . , 1),
(φ(y[1]), . . . , φ(y[n])) =
{
(0, 2, 0, 2, . . . , 0, 2), n even
(0, 2, 0, 2, . . . , 0, 2, 1), n odd
where x[l] := x1,l, . . . , xk,l and y[l] := y1,l, . . . , yk,l. The
exact computations for both input sequences are equal, that is,
f(xk) = f(yk) = 1, however, the distributions of randomly
sampled approximations for inputs xk and yk are different:
Fˆ (xk) is equal to 1 with probability one, while Fˆ (yk) is
hypergeometrically distributed. This shows that the randomly
sampled estimates cannot be perfectly simulated from only the
exact function computation without access to the original input
sequences. In general, when the sample-wise function φ(·) can
take more than two different values, there exist many functions
for which the distribution of the randomly sampled estimate
can be used to statistically distinguish between different sets
of input sequences that produce identical outputs when the
function is computed exactly.
The difficulty of practically achieving functional privacy
motivates us to argue for a weaker notion of approximation pri-
vacy applicable to the asymptotic regime that we are interested
in. The approximation privacy of our sampling-based estimate
is affected by the choice of the sampling parameter m in
relation to the overall sequence length n. For example, in one
extreme, when m is equal to one (or similarly small and fixed),
the subsampling estimate would be inaccurate and provide
substantially different information than the exact computation
(namely, the sampled computation over a small subset of the
data, which in general is not likely to be representative of the
exact computation). On the other extreme, when m is equal
to n, that is the entire sequence is sampled, the computation
would be exact and the concern of approximation privacy
would become irrelevant. However, the particular asymptotic
scenario that we are interested in is when the number of
samples m increases to infinity, but the ratio of samples to total
sequence length m/n decreases to zero, that is, the sequence
length n grows faster than the sampling parameter m. This is
the asymptotic where both the distortion and communication
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cost become vanishing (as shown by Corollary 1), and where
we will argue that the approximate computation is essentially
as private as the exact computation.
Consider a hypothetical scheme that produces an output
consisting of the exact computation f(xk) along with m
locations L1, . . . , Lm that are independently chosen uniformly
without replacement from {1, . . . , n}. Clearly, this output
would not reveal any more information about the inputs than
the exact computation alone, and this hypothetical scheme
would be perfectly functionally private. Thus, there is no loss
in the approximation privacy by appending a list of random
independent locations to the exact computation, producing the
output (f(xk), L1, . . . , Lm). The output of our schemes swaps
the exact computation with a sampling-based estimate that
is dependent on the random locations, (Fˆ (xk), L1, . . . , Lm),
specifically the normalized function computed only over these
locations, which may reveal information that is substantially
different than the exact computation. The concern of approx-
imation privacy for our schemes thus boils down to whether
this output reveals substantially different information than the
exact computation appended to random locations.
In our asymptotic of interest (with both n and m growing,
but allowing m/n to become vanishing), we have established
that the approximation Fˆ (xk) converges to the exact compu-
tation f(xk), for any input sequences xk, in terms of both
mean error (by Corollary 1) and probability (following from
Lemma 3). We propose that the property of convergence
in probability provides a reasonable level of approximation
privacy for schemes in this asymptotic. Concretely, the level of
approximation privacy is given by a pair parameters δ,  > 0,
which is said to be satisfied if, for all sequences xk,
Pr
[∣∣Fˆ (xk)− f(xk)∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ ,
and where the objective is to minimize both δ and . Using this
convergence property to define the condition for approximation
privacy can be interpreted as: for a party to gain any significant
information from the approximation beyond that obtained from
the exact computation, they would have to encounter the
event that the random sampling chooses locations for which
the approximate computation is significantly different than
the exact computation. Lemma 3 implies that the sampling
approximation can be made to fall within an arbitrarily small
neighborhood (δ → 0) of the exact computation with arbitrar-
ily high probability ( → 0), in the asymptotic of growing
sample size m (even if the sampling ratio m/n diminishes to
zero), and thus the schemes can achieve an arbitrary level
of approximation privacy. This consequence of the lemma
can be interpreted as follows: despite the scheme revealing
the sampled approximation along with the sampling locations
rather than the exact computation over the full sequences,
the approximation becomes arbitrarily representative of (and
hence does not reveal information substantially different from)
the exact computation, in the asymptotic of interest.
A natural remaining question is whether the schemes could
be further improved by concealing the sampling locations,
while still keeping the communication cost on the same
vanishing order. Concealment of the sampling conditions could
be achieved with the general secure multi-party computation
techniques of [2], however, these would require total bits
exchanged for communications to be on the order of the full
sequence length n, defeating the purpose of communication
cost savings via sampling. To the best of our knowledge,
all known approaches for performing sampling allowing for
the computation of the sampled approximation of general
(nontrivial) functions, while also concealing the sampling loca-
tions and providing unconditional privacy, would require total
bits exchanged for communications to be at least O(n). We
conjecture that any such scheme may inherently require total
bits exchanged to be on the order n, and hence that vanishing
communication cost cannot be achieved for a sampling-based
approach that conceals sampling locations. Further examina-
tion of this conjecture is left for future work.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has introduced a distortion-theoretic approach
for secure multi-party computation with unconditional privacy.
By generalizing the dimensionality reduction via sampling
technique of [8], we have constructed protocols that securely
compute any normalized sum-type function with arbitrarily
high accuracy and vanishing communication cost. This result
is particularly relevant in secure statistical analysis of dis-
tributed databases, since many empirical statistical measures
can be represented as normalized sum-type functions and
overwhelming data sizes can be overcome by providing an effi-
cient and accurate approximate computation. The technique of
randomized sampling allowed us to overcome the worst-case
distortion criterion, yielding the result that for any sequences
(x1, . . . ,xk) of any arbitrary length n, the expected absolute
error of the function estimate constructed from only m random
samples is inversely proportional to
√
m.
Future directions of work for this problem include exploring
how these dimensionality reduction techniques can be applied
to a more general class of functions. One possible extension is
to consider general functions of the joint type of the sequences
(i.e., permutation-invariant functions). However, challenges
may arise for those functions that are sensitive to small errors
in the joint type estimate, such as parity functions. Another di-
rection for future work is to formulate and extend the results to
the two-party scenario, which requires external randomness. In
the two-party scenario (k = 2), in general, secure computation
cannot be performed from scratch [13]. To extend these results
to a two-party scenario, the randomized sampling technique
could be paired with secure function computation techniques
that utilize an oblivious transfer primitive [14] or a binary
erasure channel (see [5]). A notion of communication cost
similar to [5] could be defined by also counting the number
of erasure channel uses or oblivious transfer primitive uses
in addition to bits of error-free communication and dividing
by n. In these extensions, it would also be possible to prove
similar results on achieving vanishing distortion and vanishing
communication cost, while maintaining unconditional security.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We will prove the theorem in two stages:
1) Show that the sampling-based estimate achieves vanish-
ing distortion.
2) Demonstrate protocols that compute this estimate se-
curely with vanishing communication cost.
In Section IV, we analyze the approximation for normalized
sum-type functions estimated from randomly sampling the
sequences. Lemma 2 shows that this function estimate, given
in (5), meets the accuracy requirement of the theorem given
by (2). We leverage this result and construct protocols, given
in Section V, that securely and exactly realize this function
approximation. All of our protocols securely compute this
sampled estimate, using general secure computation tech-
niques to provide security, while leveraging the sampling to
achieve the claimed bit rate. In Section V, we determine
more precise bit rates, which depend on function structure
and choice of protocol. However, all of the protocols achieve
rates on the same order as claimed in the theorem.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The protocols in Section V require a fully connected net-
work since messages must be sent between each pair of parties
over a private channel. However, with a partially connected
network, one can simulate private channels routed through
other parties in order to simulate a fully connected network.
The secure transmission results of [15] establish that a message
can be privately transmitted from a source-vertex A to a
destination-vertex B using t + 1 independent links between
A and B provided that a passive adversary can only eavesdrop
on up to t of those links. This can be done by using a secret
sharing scheme to split the message into t + 1 shares, of
which all of them need to be known in order to recover the
message (see [15] for details). Menger’s theorem [16] states
that since G has minimum vertex cut greater than t, there
exist at least t+ 1 vertex-independent paths between any pair
of non-adjacent vertices. Whenever a message needs to be
sent between a pair of parties that are not directly connected,
we can use the techniques of [15] to privately transmit the
message, which is split into shares and routed over the t+ 1
non-overlapping paths. Since there are t+1 independent links,
no coalition of size t parties can eavesdrop on the transmission,
and hence a private channel is effectively simulated. The need
to route the message over multiple paths increases the total
communication cost, however, since k is held fixed, the order
with respect to m and n remains the same, i.e., O(m log n)/n.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Observing that M(xk) has a hypergeometric distribution,
the mean and variance of the type estimate Pˆxk(xk) can be
given by
E
[
Pˆxk(x
k)
]
=
E[M(xk)]
m
=
N(xk)
n
= Pxk(x
k),
Var
[
Pˆxk(x
k)
]
=
Var[M(xk)]
m2
=
N(xk)(n−N(xk))(n−m)
mn2(n− 1)
≤ N(x
k)
mn
=
Pxk(x
k)
m
.
Thus, the mean squared error summed across xk ∈ X1× . . .×
Xk is given by
ΣMSE := E
[∑
xk
∣∣Pˆxk(xk)− Pxk(xk)∣∣2
]
=
∑
xk
Var
[
Pˆxk(x
k)
] ≤ 1
m
.
Continuing with Jensen’s inequality yields a bound on the
expected L2 norm of the error,
E
[∥∥Pˆxk − Pxk∥∥2] ≤√ΣMSE ≤ 1√m.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The absolute error of the function estimate is bounded by∣∣Fˆi(xk)− fi(xk)∣∣ = ∣∣∣∑
xk
φi(x
k)
(
Pˆxk(x
k)− Pxk(xk)
)∣∣∣
≤ ∥∥φi∥∥2 · ∥∥Pˆxk − Pxk∥∥2,
due to the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, where∥∥φi∥∥2 = √∑
xk
|φi(xk)|2.
Thus, the expected absolute error is bounded by
E
[∣∣Fˆi(xk)− fi(xk)∣∣] ≤ ‖φi‖2√
m
.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Our function estimate given by (5) can be rewritten as
follows,
Fˆi(x
k) :=
1
m
m∑
l=1
Yl,
where
Yl := φi(x1,Ll , . . . , xk,Ll),
illustrating that the estimate is a normalized sum of random
variables drawn uniformly without replacement from the set
{φi(x1,l, . . . , xk,l)}nl=1 .
Since the empirical mean of the set is
1
n
n∑
l=1
φi(x1,l, . . . , xk,l) = fi(x
k),
and each element is bounded in the range
[minxk φi(x
k),maxxk φi(x
k)], we can apply Hoeffding’s
inequality [17, Thm. 2], which is applicable to normalized
sums of random variables drawn uniformly without
replacement (see [17, Sec. 6]), to yield the desired result,
Pr
[∣∣Fˆi(xk)− fi(xk)∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ 2 exp(−2δ2m
φrangei
)
.
